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Abstract 
Under Uganda’s decentralised system, rural water service delivery remains to some extent problematic. 
Several studies attribute the possible causes of deficiencies in the water sector to governance issues. 
This article applies social network analysis to map upward and downward water-related information 
flows between the actors of local government from village to district level. Comparing the actual 
information-sharing network with what’s on paper reveals a less reciprocal and more centralised 
network than that theoretically envisaged. Some actors, such as the district water officer, are more 
central than expected in terms of sending and receiving information, while others seem to underperform. 
Our findings show, however, that it is not the political–administrative information exchange which is 
the biggest obstacle, but rather information flows between higher (district and sub-county) and lower 
(parish and village) levels of the local governance structure. Adding water users to the analysis reveals 
the village chairperson as the most crucial broker of information upward to duty bearers at district 
level. The limited role of water user committees also becomes apparent. The authors conclude that 
information communication technology holds potential to overcome some of the bottlenecks (eg 
distance) hindering the flow of water-related information between actors at different levels.  
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Introduction  
Extensive literature (eg Chowns 2015; Naiga et al. 2015) affirms that water provision among many rural 
communities in sub-Saharan Africa is typically problematic. Widely cited problems include multiple 
water delivery approaches employed by numerous actors, which are often uncoordinated and unsuited 
to local conditions; inadequate monitoring of water sources by state actors due to resource constraints 
and logistical difficulties; little sense of ownership among communities of water projects and 
infrastructure; weak voluntarism among community-based water user communities; and non-
functionality of hand pumps (Golooba-Mutebi 2012; Van den Broek and Brown 2015; Naiga et al. 
2015). During the 1990s, the ‘top-down state-led’ approach to rural water provision was widely 
criticised for having ignored and failed communities (Van den Broek and Brown 2015, p. 51). 
Decentralisation of service delivery to lower levels of government was advanced as an effective 
strategy, with the argument that it would stimulate community participation in the identification and 
implementation of sustainable solutions to water-related crises (Golooba-Mutebi 2012). As a result, 
since the 1990s water delivery approaches based on the community-based management (CBM) model 
have gained popularity across the continent, including Uganda, the focus of this study. 
Blueprints of structures and systems exist to guide the planning, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation of water service provision. The flow of information between diverse actors at different levels 
of local government, as well as capacities for inspection, supervision and accountability enforcement, 
have been noted as crucial factors for effective rural water service delivery (Golooba-Mutebi 2012). 
Under decentralisation, however, deficiencies in Uganda’s rural water service provision persist. While 
several authors (Harvey 2007; Jones 2011; Quin et al. 2011; Le Gouais and Wach 2013) attribute the 
deficiencies to weak implementation of CBM models, others (Blaikie 2006; Brown 2013; Van den 
Broek and Brown 2015) have critiqued the viability of the models themselves in delivering sustainable 
solutions to rural communities.  
Building on previous studies which have showcased the importance of information flows between 
different actors for a smooth functioning of decentralised service delivery (see eg Andersson 2004; 
Ringold et al. 2012), the present study examines in detail different information streams. The authors 
examine both horizontal and vertical information exchange, as both are considered important for 
nurturing trust among different actors in a system and for stimulating service delivery effectiveness, 
efficiency and accountability (Andersson 2004; Ringold et al. 2012). Horizontal information exchange, 
between actors that are positioned at similar levels, triggers learning about opportunities to combine 
resources and solve common problems (Andersson 2004). As regards vertical information exchange, a 
distinction is usually made between top-down (downward) and bottom-up (upward) flows.  
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While the former inform lower-level actors in the chain about policies, guidelines and plans that need 
to be implemented locally, the latter provide useful information to higher-level actors about local-level 
problems, needs and priorities. Ideally, the two are interconnected, with higher-level actors providing 
feedback on local-level information as well as sharing information about analyses done at a higher level 
(for example regarding water quality). In particular, in the CBM model, where water users are an integral 
part of the model, upward and downward information streams which include both citizens and water 
user committees are considered a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for addressing poor 
service delivery (see eg Nicol and Odinga 2016; Björkman and Svensson 2009; Honkalaskar et al. 2014).  
This study starts by analysing the existing reporting channels stipulated in official Ugandan water-
related documents (see Government of Uganda 1997b; Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment 
1999, 2003; Ministry of Water and Environment 2011, 2013), as well as previous studies (eg Quin et 
al. 2011) which have outlined the theoretical reporting and information-sharing networks among 
government actors involved in rural water service delivery. It then compares what exists on paper with 
actual information-sharing within one local government area of Uganda. In line with CBM literature, it 
also moves beyond government actors to include information exchange with citizens.  
The authors deviate from earlier related studies – which have mainly relied upon narrative approaches 
(see eg Golooba-Mutebi 2012; Van den Broek and Brown 2015) – by using social network analysis 
(SNA). SNA is a technique which allows users to systematically study patterns of relationships among 
actors and entities, including those based on information exchange. In doing so, both the structural 
network features (eg the degree to which all actors share information with each other) and individual 
positions in a network (eg which actors, if any, receive more information than others) are analysed using 
formal network measures and graphical depiction. The present study uses SNA to compare the 
theoretical reporting and information-sharing networks (as stipulated in the official water-related 
documents as well as previous studies) with actual information networks, by mapping them based on a 
network survey of the actors involved. The study compares overall network structures, ascertains who 
the central actors are, and identifies missing links and bottlenecks. It also assesses whether assumptions 
made about information flows at individual and network level are valid.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: section two gives an overview of the current situation in 
Uganda; section three describes the research setting and methodology applied; section four presents and 
discusses the study’s results; and section five offers conclusions and some recommendations.  
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Water service delivery in Uganda 
The wave of democratic reform across many African countries during the 1990s brought with it 
devolution of power from central to local governments. In Uganda, decentralisation was introduced by 
the National Resistance Movement government in the aftermath of political strife, with the aim of 
improving local democracy, accountability, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of service 
delivery. The devolution of power to local governments in Uganda occurred in successive stages, 
starting with its enshrinement in the Local Governments (Resistance Councils) Statute 1993, followed 
by the Constitution of Uganda 1995, and subsequently the Local Governments Act 1997 and its revision 
in 2000 (Azfar and Livingstone 2002; Steiner 2006).  
In accordance with the Local Governments Act 1997, Uganda has a five-tier decentralised structure, 
with the tiers being Local Councils (LCs), I, II, III, IV and V. At the most local level are villages (LC 
I), followed by parishes (LC II), then sub-counties (LC III), counties (LC IV), and finally districts (LC 
V). The Local Governments Act 1997 mandates the district, as the highest level of local government, 
to provide basic services, including water, to communities under its jurisdiction. Service delivery is the 
direct mandate of the district and sub-counties, while other tiers in the structure (counties, parishes and 
villages) play a supporting role (Golooba-Mutebi 2012). Rural water service provision in theory follows 
the CBM approach and is guided by legal and policy documents which include the Water Act 1997, the 
National Water Policy (NWP) 1999, the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Strategic and Investment 
Plan 2000-2015, the National Framework for Operation and Maintenance of Rural Water Supplies 2011 
and the Revised District Implementation Manual 2013.  
The NWP underscores an integrated approach to service delivery involving multiple stakeholders: local 
government departments, the private sector (NGOs and private contractors), and water users led by 
water user committees (WUCs). A demand–response approach is followed which places responsibility 
for ownership and management of water point facilities with water users, who “demand a water service, 
decide the technology, contribute towards the construction, voluntarily manage the water source and 
pay for its upkeep” (Van den Broek and Brown 2015, p. 51). The district, for its part, provides 
maintenance and follow-up support (Brown 2013). It is worth noting at the outset that the success of 
such demand–response approaches is often premised on the existence of strong upward and downward 
information and communication flows between actors (see eg Tumushabe et al. 2011).  
In line with this approach, Uganda’s Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Strategic and Investment Plan 
2000–2015 specifies key strategies to ensure effective service delivery, including information-sharing 
and awareness-raising, coordination and collaboration between major actors, private sector 
participation, and monitoring and reporting (Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment 2003). These 
guidelines notwithstanding, studies in Uganda have revealed problems in rural water service delivery, 
notably unsatisfactory supervision and monitoring by the district administration, non-functional WUCs, 
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and poor-quality water facilities delivered by unsupervised private contractors (Golooba-Mutebi 2012). 
This study unpacks the information-sharing networks among actors in a bid to determine their influence 
on the effectiveness of service delivery. 
Research design and methodology 
Point water source technologies in rural Uganda include “deep and shallow wells fitted with hand pumps, 
protected springs, public taps from gravity-flow schemes and rainwater harvesting tanks” (Mugumya 
2013, p. 10). Several studies (Forster 2013; Mugumya 2013; Naiga et al. 2015) note that rural 
communities across Uganda with these point water technologies typically face similar challenges.  
Given the generally problematic nature of rural water service delivery, this study opted for a ‘most 
likely’ case study design (Yin 2009), on the assumption that any challenges identified in the relatively 
better-performing districts are likely to also occur in worse-performing districts. Bushenyi District in 
south-west Uganda was therefore purposively chosen as a case study, since it performs better than the 
national average in terms of rural population access to safe water (93% compared to 68%) and the 
functionality of its point water sources (90% compared to 84%) (Ministry of Water & Environment 2017). 
One village in a rural sub-county of Bushenyi District1 was selected to permit a detailed examination 
of information-sharing networks across the governance levels, from water users to the district office. 
Since data collection for full network analysis entails surveying all inhabitants in the village, the study 
village (due to time and budget constraints) had to be a relatively small village. Furthermore, the village 
was selected as a ‘typical’ small rural village within the Bushenyi district, using criteria such as being 
some distance from the main road, and without a ward office, and having a socio-economic profile (eg 
educational level) comparable to other villages in Bushenyi. Ninety-five percent of the population of 
the sub-county have access to safe water; and 92% of point water facilities in the sub-county are 
functional. Specific challenges relating to water supply in the village, according to inhabitants, are low 
water quality (61.6%) and water points being located far away from households (15.1%). 
The information used in this study was obtained from multiple sources. A first approach was desk 
reviews of national legal and policy documents, as well as of relevant academic literature. Other sources 
were key informant interviews held with 21 duty bearers (politicians and technocrats) linked to the 
village, and a focus group discussion with local leaders in the village. The focus group discussion 
informed a participatory mapping of all the point water sources in use according to quality, access and 
functionality, which allowed a deeper appreciation of water-related issues affecting the village. The 
chains of communication for voicing demands and reporting, as perceived by citizens, were also 
discussed, which facilitated the identification of missing links.     
                                                 
1 The authors do not disclose the name of the village or the sub-county because of the sensitive nature of SNA 
findings and the fact that various individuals in the network might be easily identifiable.  
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Lastly, a survey was conducted of 92 water users aged 25 years and above residing in the selected 
village. This population can be assumed to be able to be ‘politically active’ (not in the narrow partisan 
sense of the word, but rather in the sense of being potentially able to vote, voice concerns to duty 
bearers, to get involved in citizen action, to make their own decisions independently). With regard to 
the duty bearers, all duty bearers were interviewed irrespective of their age. Both the user survey and 
the interviews with duty bearers collected data on individual characteristics, perceptions of water 
services, and social network ties relevant to water-related information exchange. The data collected was 
analysed using SPSS software and UCINET (a specialist SNA package). To aid readability, concepts 
and measures used in the SNA are explained in more detail in the following section. To validate the 
study’s findings, the (anonymised) results were presented to key stakeholders – both political and 
technical duty bearers at district level, and in a village meeting involving the village authority and water 
users (committees) – and any comments incorporated. 
The paper’s analysis is structured in two steps. First, it focuses on the information-sharing network 
which exists among government actors (political and administrative) only. Next, it expands beyond 
government actors to include WUCs, NGOs and citizens (water users). For each network, the analysis 
highlights the most central actors in terms of sending and receiving information, analyses inter- and 
intra-group information exchange, and identifies some of the missing or underdeveloped links. 
Information sharing networks amongst government (supply side) actors 
First, the study sought to establish the extent to which the actual information-sharing network for this 
group resembles the theoretical network envisaged by the national blueprint. It used the guidelines in 
the Local Governments Act 1997 and the National Framework for Operation and Maintenance of Rural 
Water Supplies in Uganda 2011 to construct a theoretical information-sharing network. However, the 
construction was adapted to focus on structures from village level up to district level, and specifically 
on those actors with an active role to play in rural water service provision. 
Constructing the theoretical information-sharing networks 
The theoretical framework (see Figure 1) maps the official hierarchical ‘reporting chain’ (thin arrows), 
and the indirect sharing of information between political leaders and technical/administrative officials 
(thick arrows), along the hierarchy of local government. It should be noted that Figure 1 represents a 
very basic and highly hierarchical structure, which one should expect to find as a minimum in the actual 
information-sharing. While the framework in Figure 1 merely maps reporting structures that consist of 
a one-way upward communication stream, an organisational framework for the delivery of rural 
services in Uganda, elaborated by Quin et al. (2011), additionally incorporates the roles and 
responsibilities of the various actors.  
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Figure 1: Reporting chain (minimal information-sharing network) 
 
Source: Compiled by authors after Kuppens based on Government of Uganda (1997a) and Ministry of 
Water and Environment (2011)2 
Based on the preceding two frameworks, the authors applied SNA to construct social network models 
of a minimal theoretical network (theoretical ‘reporting’) and a more substantial theoretical network 
that also includes the data from Quin et al. (2011) (theoretical ‘information-sharing’). Figures 2a and 
2b below schematically depict the social network graphs of the theoretical ‘reporting’ and theoretical 
‘information-sharing’ networks respectively.  
To facilitate comparison between the two theoretical networks and the actual information-sharing 
networks, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section, Figure 2c depicts the social network 
model for actual information-sharing found in this case. The red colour denotes political duty bearers, 
while blue denotes technical/administrative duty bearers. An information-sharing tie is depicted by an 
arrow. HA stands for Health Assistant, CDO stands for Community Development Officer and CAO 
stands for Chief Administrative Officer. 
  
                                                 
2 A first version of the figure was compiled by our PhD student M Kuppens and later updated by the authors.  
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Figures 2a-c: Comparison of theoretical networks with actual information-sharing networks 
Figure 2a: Theoretical ‘reporting’ network 
 
 
Figure 2b: Theoretical ‘information-sharing’ network 
 
 
 
                                    Figure 2c: Actual information-sharing network 
      
  Source for Figures 2a-2c: authors 2018 
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Comparing the theoretical and the actual information-sharing networks 
Based on the social network graphics and analysis, it is possible to compare some of the basic descriptive 
measures of the actual information-sharing network (Figure 2c) to the two theoretical networks (Figures 
2a and 2b), examining whether significant differences exist between the official reporting/information-
sharing and the actual information-sharing network. Table 1 lists and compares the ties and actors, the 
overall cohesiveness and intensity of information exchange (average degree,3 density4 and number of 
isolates), centralisation5 and width (average distance) and reciprocity across the three networks.  
Table 1: Descriptive network characteristics of the theoretical & actual information-sharing networks 
Social network 
characteristic 
Theoretical network 
(hierarchical reporting) (2a) 
Theoretical network 
(information-sharing) (2b) 
Actual information-
sharing network (2c) 
Number of ties 29 97 82 
Number of actors 21 21 20 
Number of isolates 0 0 0 
Average degree 1.381 4.619 4.10 
Degree centralisation 0.089 0.132 0.287 
Outdegree centralisation 0.085 0.125 0.271 
Indegree centralisation 0.295 0.282 0.438 
Density 0.069 0.231 0.216 
Average distance 1.855 2.352 2.037 
Arc reciprocity 0.207 0.742 0.341 
 
Table 1 shows that whereas the hierarchical ‘reporting’ network has only 29 reported ties for a total of 
21 official actors, the actual information-sharing network has 82 ties with a total of 20 actors.6 The 
network density, measured by the ratio of actual ties to possible ties, is often used in SNA as a measure 
to express the overall cohesiveness of a network. The density of the actual information-sharing network 
is 0.216, indicating that 21.6% of all possible information-sharing ties among the supply-side actors in 
government are active. This density is relatively similar to the theoretical information-sharing network 
at 0.231 or 23.1% of possible ties. In contrast, the hierarchical ‘reporting’ network has a density of just 
0.069 or 6.9% of possible ties, indicating that in reality more information exchange takes place amongst 
officials than is strictly called for by the guidelines. Correspondingly, the average degree results show 
that government actors share information with an estimated 4.10 actors compared to the 1.38 actors 
envisaged under the minimal theoretical reporting network. This leads us to conclude that, on average, 
more information is actually being exchanged among government actors than reporting chains would 
minimally require, and this information-sharing is only slightly less than is envisaged in the theoretical 
information-sharing network (average degree = 4.69). However, the arc reciprocity ratio, which 
                                                 
3 The average degree of a node (in an unvalued network) is the average number of ties a node has (Hanneman and 
Riddle 2005). 
4 The density of a network is measured as the ratio of actual ties to the possible ties. Nodes that are not connected 
to any other node are called isolates (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). 
5 Centralisation is a measure of the difference between the number of ties that the most central node has and the 
number of ties of all other nodes (Borgatti et al. 2013). The measure can vary from 0 (where each node is connected 
to every other node) to 100 (where all nodes are connected to only 1 node). 
6 The village vice-chairperson in our case study in practice did not take up an active role. 
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measures what proportion of the ties that exist are reciprocated, indicates that the actual information 
sharing network is far less reciprocal (arc reciprocity ratio = 0.341) than the theoretical information 
sharing network (arc reciprocity ratio = 0.742).  
Table 1 also shows zero isolates across the three social network models, implying that none of the actors 
in any of the three models is completely disconnected from the rest of the actors in the network. SNA 
also enables us to gauge the distance that information has to ‘travel’ to reach actors in the network. The 
average distance between two actors is 2.037 ties, implying that, on average, one government actor can 
reach another government actor with only two steps. The official reporting chain is even slightly more 
efficient in facilitating short distances for information to travel (1.85 steps).  
The degree centralisation index, on the other hand, reveals whether information-sharing is concentrated 
among a few central nodes, or whether it is equally spread throughout the entire network. The overall 
degree centralisation index is 0.287, indicating a modest level degree of centralisation in the sharing of 
information. Interestingly, however, incoming ties (receiving information) are more centralised (0.438) 
than outgoing ties (sending information) at 0.271. The latter results imply that a relatively small group 
of supply-side actors receive most of the information that is sent through the network. In contrast, the 
official ‘reporting’ network reveals a much lower overall degree centralisation index of 0.089, 
indicating that information-sharing is meant to be far less centralised than it is in reality. 
There are several measures (Pearson correlation coefficient, Jaccard index, simple matching coefficient) 
that can be used to check the association between two network ties. Considering that all the network 
ties7 in this study are binary ties, the authors used the simple matching coefficient measure, which records 
the degree of matching between the official reporting ties and information-sharing ties between the same 
actors (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). The Jaccard index is specifically designed for sparse networks, as 
it only calculates the number of times that both actors report a tie to the same third actor as a percentage 
of the total number of ties reported. Both the Jaccard index (Jaccard = 0.146, p = 0.002)8 and the 
matching coefficient (matching coefficient = 0.78, p = 0.002) flag a significant positive association 
between the actual information-sharing network and the theoretical ‘reporting’ network. Similarly, a 
positive and significant association was found between the actual and the theoretical information-
sharing networks (matching coefficient = 0.724, p = 0.000 and Jaccard index = 0.250, p = 0.000).  
                                                 
7 Calculation of the matching coefficient and Jaccard index require that the actors in the two networks be identical. 
To facilitate comparison, this study has removed the village vice-chairperson from the theoretical ‘reporting’ and 
‘information-sharing’ networks. The village vice-chairperson has very few ties to other duty bearers and will 
therefore not substantially alter the correlation between different network ties. 
8 To test for the significance of the correlation between the two network ties, UCINET applies quadratic 
assignment procedure (QAP) (Hubert and Schultz 1976; Krackhardt 1988), which is a bootstrapping procedure 
based on random permutations to develop standard errors to assess whether the actual association is statistically 
significant (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). 
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Identifying key actors  
Using centrality measures, the paper identifies the ‘key’ actors in the information-sharing network. 
There are different types of centrality indices, which capture different aspects of what it means to be 
‘central’ in a network. The degree centrality measure only takes into account the number of ties directly 
adjacent to the node, but it does differentiate between incoming ties (indegree centrality) and outgoing 
ties (outdegree centrality). Since degree centrality is a ‘localised’ manner of measuring an individual’s 
influential position in a network – because it only takes into account the persons that one is directly 
connected to (see eg Ward et al. 2011) – the authors also chose to compute ‘closeness’ centrality and 
‘betweenness centrality’. Closeness centrality reflects the length of the shortest paths between an actor 
and each of the other actors in the network. Consequently, a lower number indicates that the actor is 
more central in the network. Closeness centrality therefore indicates who is best placed to efficiently 
disseminate or collect information from the whole network. The authors further distinguish between 
‘incloseness’ and ‘outcloseness’ centrality to take into account the difference between incoming and 
outgoing ties. Betweenness centrality, on the other hand, quantifies the extent to which a node is 
positioned on the geodesic path between any given pair of individuals within the whole network 
(Freeman 1979). Hence, betweenness centrality captures to what extent an individual has strategic 
power within the network by being on the shortest information route between two individuals.  
Table 2 lists the scores for all actors on the different centrality measures. Incoming (indegree and 
incloseness) and outgoing (outdegree and outcloseness) are grouped together, alongside the 
betweenness centrality measures. The table differentiates between the two theoretical networks: the 
official reporting network and the information-sharing network on the one hand, and the actual 
(empirical) information-sharing network on the other hand. One key finding is that the most central 
actor in the actual network – the DWO – is the same for all centrality types. The top rank occupied by 
the DWO is somewhat unexpected. Based on the theoretical framework (both official reporting and 
information-sharing), the chief administrative officer (CAO) would have been expected to occupy the 
highest rank (indegree centrality). Also, the DWO is under the supervision of the district engineer; yet 
in the actual information network, the DWO is the most influential actor. In terms of sending 
information to other actors (outdegree and outcloseness centrality), receiving information from other 
actors (indegree and incloseness centrality) and controlling information pathways (betweenness 
centrality), the DWO has the top score.  
Moreover, in Table 2 a quite substantial difference exists in scores for indegree and betweenness 
centrality between the DWO and other supply-side actors. In terms of receiving information, the other 
top five influential actors include the sub-county chairperson, district chairperson, district engineer and 
CAO. The community development officer (CDO) and deputy CAO are also among the top five 
influential actors with regard to sending information. Relatively more peripheral than might be 
expected, based on the theoretical information-sharing networks, are the sub-county extension workers 
(sub-county CDO and health assistant) and the sub-county chief, who score low in terms of actually 
sharing information. Similarly, the parish-level actors (LC II chairperson and parish chief) score low in 
both sending and receiving information, compared to what would have been expected.  
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Table 2: Government actor scores on centrality measures by social network model 
 
THEORETICAL MINIMAL INFORMATION- 
SHARING (REPORTING) NETWORK 
THEORETICAL  
INFORMATION-SHARING NETWORK  
 
 
ACTUAL INFORMATION-SHARING NETWORK 
Indeg Between OutDeg Indeg Between OutDeg Indeg Inclose Between OutDeg OutClose 
ACTOR Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
District water officer 0  0.000  1  2  0.750  6 2 12 1 29 1 122.483 1 9 1 37 1 
LC III chair 4 3 12.000 1 2 3 7 5 99.465 1 5  9 2 33 2 34.317 3 2  44  
Engineer 2 5 1.167 7 1  6 6 33.487 5 7 1 8 3 35 3 48.783 2 7 3 38 3 
LC V chair 6 2 6.167 4 1  6 6 86.238 2 6 2 7 4 37 5 0.000  1  53  
CAO 7 1 7.333 3 1  10 1 83.495 3 4  7 4 35 3 24.200 5 7 3 38 3 
LC III chief 4 3 8.667 2 2 3 9 2 57.584 4 6 2 6 6 37 5 34.033 4 4 8 42 8 
LC V vicechair 0  0.000  1 
 3  0.000  4 
 5 7 40 9 6.283 10 4 8 41 7 
LC III HA 0  0.000  3 1 9 2 22.025 8 6 2 5 7 39 7 11.233 7 3  49  
LC V  Female councillor  0  
 
0.000 
 1  1  0.000  2  4 9 41 10 
 
5.750  3  48  
LC III area councillor  0  0.000  1  2 
 0.000  2  4 9 39 7 5.917  2  54  
LC V CDO 2 5 1.167 7 1  5 8 27.570 6 6 2 3  46  7.683 9 5 6 40 6 
LC V chair commission 
of works 
0 
 
 
0.000 
 
1 
 
3 
 
0.000 
 
4 
 
2 
 
44 
 
0.0008 
 
4 
8 
42 8 
LC V councillor  0  0.000 
 1  3  5.127 
 5  2  44  2.133  5 6 45  
Deputy CAO 0  0.000 
 1  2  1.383 
 4  2  44  5.750  6 5 39 5 
Water CDO 0  0.000  1  2  0.500  5  2  52  10.133 8 8 2 37 1 
LC II chair 2 5 5.833 5 2 3 3  25.394 7 5 
 2  56  0.000  0  95  
LC I chair 0  0.000  1  4 9 3.381  3  1  45  17.500 6 3  53  
LC III CDO 0  0.000  3 1 9 2 22.025 8 6 2 1  51  0.000  3  43 10 
LC II chief 1 8 1.667 6 2 3 4 9 11.992 10 5  0  95  0.000  3  50  
LC III secretary of works 0  0.000 
 1  3  3.583 
 2  0  95  0.000  3  49  
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In Figures 3a-c, indegree centrality is graphically depicted by the size of nodes. Bigger nodes indicate 
that the actor receives more information from other duty bearers.  
Figure 3a: Theoretical ‘reporting’ network 
 
 
Figure 3b: Theoretical ‘information-sharing’ network 
 
 
Figure 3c: Actual information-sharing network 
 
              Source for Figures 3a-c: authors 2018 
Dewachter, Bamanyaki & Holvoet Information flows in Ugandan rural water service 
 
       CJLG 2019 14 
 
Figures 3a-c clearly depict the central role of the DWO, as well as that of the sub-county chairperson, 
the CAO and the district chairperson. They also show that the parish-level and sub-county 
technical/administrative actors are more peripheral in the actual information-sharing network than in the 
theoretical networks. Whereas the DWO receives and sends more water-related information than 
expected, the sub-county chief, sub-county CDO and health assistant receive and send less information 
than would be expected based on their position and role. 
Identifying main information flows and missing links 
Ensuring accurate, needs-based, demand-driven and efficient policy-making and implementation 
requires the smooth flow of information among actors who are differently positioned. New demand for 
point water sources and information regarding defects, for instance, should be reported upward, while 
information on water infrastructure (water quality) and plans for rehabilitation and maintenance should 
be conveyed downward. Furthermore, in Uganda district and sub-county offices are mandated to 
monitor access, functionality and quality of point water sources, and hence should receive accurate 
information travelling upward from the level of water users. 
To get a more accurate understanding of the actual information flows among actors, the authors analysed 
within-group and between-group information flows based on the densities of information among or 
between them. First they evaluated the information flows between the political and administrative actors; 
then those between the different tiers of the decentralised system (ie village, parish, sub-county, district); 
and finally they differentiated between upward and downward information streams.  
Information flows between political and technical/administrative actors: Table 3 presents the number 
of ties as well as the densities – ie the total number of ties as a share of the total number of possible ties 
– among the political and technical/administrative actors combined over all governance levels. The most 
intense information exchange is among the technical/administrative staff (density = 0.344, N ties = 31), 
indicating that about one-third of all possible information ties are actually in use. The 
technical/administrative staff also quite actively share information with political duty bearers (density = 
0.24, N ties = 24), while political duty bearers share less information with technical/administrative staff 
(density = 0.150, N ties = 15). Based on this first crude analysis, the political–administrative divide does 
not appear to be the biggest stumbling block in terms of information flows; at least not when aggregated 
over the governance levels. 
Table 3: Intensity of information exchange between political duty bearers & technical/administrative staff 
  Densities  N ties 
  
Political 
Technical/ 
administrative 
 Political 
Technical/ 
administrative 
Political 0.133 0.150 Political 12 15 
Technical/ 
administrative 0.240 0.344 
Technical/ 
administrative 24 31 
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Information flows between governance levels: Table 4 presents density scores across the different tiers 
of the local governance system, with the duty bearers grouped according to the level at which they operate. 
The results in Table 4 highlight that the densest information exchange occurs among actors at the same 
level (the diagonal line from top left to bottom right in the ‘Density’ section of the table), with the bulk 
of information exchange taking place among district-level officials. However, the fact that there is only 
one village-level official compared to 11 district-level officials significantly influences the number of 
ties that can be expected. The village- and parish-level officials also show a high density of information 
exchange, after controlling for the total number of possible ties. 
Table 4: Intensity of information exchange between different tiers of the local governance system 
  Density Number of ties 
 
Village Parish Sub-county District 
 
Village Parish Sub-county District 
Village 0.500 0.333 0 
 
Village 1 2 0 
 
Parish 0 0.500 0.167 0 Parish 0 1 2 0 
Sub-county 0 0 0.333 0.106 Sub-county 0 0 10 7 
District 0.091 0 0.167 0.427 District 1 0 11 47 
Regarding information exchange between levels of governance, it is evident that there is considerable 
information exchange between district and sub-county level officials, albeit with more information 
travelling from district to sub-county level than the reverse. Information exchange with lower 
governance levels, however, appears to be more limited. 
Upward and downward information flows: Out of a total of 82 information-sharing ties, only 12 ties 
(namely all ties below the diagonal) qualify as ‘downward information ties’- information that flows from 
higher-level to lower-level officials. Out of these 12 ties, 11 ties (92%) are information flows from the 
district to sub-county level and only one downward tie links higher governance levels (sub-county and 
district duty bearers) to the parish or village levels. The latter findings point towards a possible weakness 
in terms of feedback information from higher (district and sub-county) to lower (parish and village) 
governance levels; a situation which has been documented elsewhere in Uganda (see eg Flint 2003). In 
fact, this ‘feedback’ deficiency is not just typical for Uganda or the water sector, but is rather a widely 
discussed phenomenon in public administration and evaluation literature which in the medium to long run 
also negatively affects the quantity and quality of upward information streams (see eg Mackay 2007). 
Lack of feedback and responsiveness from higher government levels might for instance affect actors’ 
belief in the effectiveness of their data collection and upward channelling of information, and thereby 
disincentivise further investment in these activities. The authors of the present study also came across this 
phenomenon during other field research in the same Ugandan setting (Dewachter and Holvoet 2017). 
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Figure 4 maps the upward (green), downward (orange) and horizontal (grey) information-sharing 
between the different governance levels. At district level, the overwhelming majority of information-
sharing is horizontal, either among political duty bearers, among technical/administrative staff or 
between technical/administrative staff and political duty bearers. Some downward information-sharing 
to sub-county level also takes place, mostly originating from the district technical office. With the one 
exception of information flow from the DWO to the village leader, there is limited downward 
information flow from the district beyond sub-county level.  
Figure 4: Upward and downward information flows among duty bearers 
 
Source: authors 2018 
At sub-county level, the results show an inverse communication pattern. There is considerable horizontal 
information-sharing combined with some upward information-sharing, but it mostly stays within the 
various ‘sectors’ – ie sub-county technical/administrative staff communicating information to district 
technical/administrative staff, sub-county political duty bearers communicating information to the 
district councillor, and so on. The sub-county chairperson also shares information with the technical 
department, notably the DWO and district engineer. Worthy of note is that neither the sub- county 
technical/administrative staff nor the sub-county political leaders pass on information to leaders at the 
village or parish level. However, these lower governance levels (village and parish) do engage in upward 
communication, with this being the only option available to the village chairperson.        
In sum, the inter- and intra-group analyses suggest that political–administrative information exchange 
is not the biggest stumbling block; rather, it is the information exchange between different governance 
levels, and more specifically between higher (district and sub-county) and lower policy levels (parish 
and village) that is insufficient. Additionally, most information exchange seems to be geared toward 
upward or horizontal information flows. Information flows from the sub-county to lower governance 
levels seem to be missing. Interviewees highlighted a variety of reasons for this lack of downward 
information, ranging from lack of capacity and funds to a lack of incentives, and the absence of any 
enforcement mechanism or sanctions for non-communication. These are familiar factors, which have 
been pointed out in earlier related studies (see eg Golooba-Mutebi 2012; Nicol and Odinga 2016). 
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Information flow networks from citizens to district officials 
So far, the authors’ analysis has focused only on the information-sharing network among official duty 
bearers (technical/administrative and political). However, in order to ensure the most efficient and effective 
information exchange network, information flows from the users of point water sources up to the level 
of district duty bearers also need to be studied (eg Nicol and Odinga 2016). This paper now moves on to 
assess the entire information chain, including citizens (water users) and water user committees (WUCs), 
as well as all duty bearers included in the previous analyses. Additionally, as suggested in the 2011 Quin 
et al. framework, NGOs are included as actors in the water services network. The goal of this analysis is 
to identify the key actors, main information flows and any missing links in Uganda’s water governance. 
Identifying key actors 
Figure 5 depicts all actors in the information chain of the rural water services sector, distinguished by 
their ‘roles’ in the information-sharing network. The blue shade denotes technical/administrative staff, 
red denotes political duty bearers, purple denotes NGOs, dark green denotes WUC members and light 
green denotes citizens (point water source users). The sizes of the nodes depict how central (‘indegree’) 
each actor is in the overall network. 
  Figure 5: Information-sharing network among duty bearers and citizens 
     
 Source: authors 2018 
The results in Figure 5 reveal that the village (LC I) chairperson now becomes the most influential actor 
in the entire information-sharing network in terms of the number of incoming ties (‘indegree centrality’) 
and the strategic position held of being on the shortest pathway between two actors (‘betweenness 
centrality’). The DWO still holds a crucial position (second most central actor) alongside the sub-county 
(LC III) chairperson, the CAO and the district (LC V) chairperson. Furthermore, the results show that 
some citizens are also very central in the network, despite not being members of the WUC. 
Dewachter, Bamanyaki & Holvoet Information flows in Ugandan rural water service 
 
       CJLG 2019 18 
 
Figure 5 also clearly illustrates the paucity of ties from the citizens at village level (light green) to higher 
levels, notably political and technical/administrative levels, with the exception of the parish chairperson. 
The latter happens to be a resident of this particular village and often takes over the role of the village 
chairperson in his absence. He thus does not really qualify as an actor at a ‘higher’ level of governance 
in this particular case. Excluding the parish chairperson, there are only two direct ties between a villager 
and any of the other duty bearers. All other information seems to go through the village chairperson, 
making him or her a crucial broker in the overall information chain. This is in line with the authors’ own 
previous in-depth research in the village, which has showcased that the village chairperson is actively 
known by all villagers and perceived to be someone committed to their well-being, while also being the 
first point of contact within the local government structure (Dewachter and Holvoet 2017). Figure 5 also 
shows that some citizens are disconnected from the information-sharing network (ie ‘isolates’) and this 
group even includes one member of the WUC. Notwithstanding the important role that is foreseen for 
the WUC in theory, this finding does not come entirely as a surprise, as the non-functioning of WUCs 
has been documented on a broader scale before (Tumushabe et al 2011; Terry et al 2015), a state of affairs 
which also holds true in the village under study. The poor functioning of WUCs is linked to, amongst 
other factors, a lack of resources and knowledge about what is expected, as well as inadequate higher-
level monitoring and enforcement (Tumushabe et al. 2011; Golooba-Mutebi 2012; Terry et al 2015).  
Identifying the main information flows and missing links in the entire information network 
Looking at the within- and between-group densities/number of ties, the results again confirm that intra-
level interaction (boxes) seems to be denser than inter-level interaction. Comparing the different 
governance levels (see Table 5), the information exchange among district-level officials appears to be 
the most intense, both among district-level technical/administrative staff, and between district-level 
technical/administrative staff and political duty bearers. Sub-county level actors also engage in 
considerable information exchange at their own level; however, beyond the ‘diagonal’ it can be seen 
that information-sharing becomes less frequent. Downward information-sharing (bold figures) is 
particularly poor. This is problematic because neither sub-county extension staff nor political duty 
bearers at sub-county level seem to reach out to citizens, WUC members, village leaders or parish level 
officials (highlighted in grey). As such, very little information trickles down, which in the medium to 
long run also undermines the upward flow of information. 
In contrast, there is some information being shared upward by citizens, the WUC and the village 
chairperson. This information is largely channelled through the village chairperson, and to a lesser extent 
through the parish chairperson, who at times informally acts as the village vice-chairperson. NGO actors 
do not seem to effectively bridge the divide between the village and parish levels and higher governance 
levels, nor between citizens and higher governance levels. 
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Table 5: Intensity of information exchange between all different actors of the information-sharing network on water-related information 
Density of ties Number of ties 
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Citizens 0.013 0.046 0.193 0.060 0 0.004 0 0 0 0 Citizens 86 27 16 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Water user 
committee 
0.012 0 0.143 0.143 0 0 0.048 0 0 0 
Water user 
committee 
7 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Village 0.036 
 
1 0 0.667 0 0 0 0 0 Village 3 
 
1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Parish political 0.036 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.143 Parish political 3 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Parish 
administrative 
0 
 
0 1 0.333 0.333 0 0 0 0 
Parish 
administrative 
0 
 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Sub-county 
political 
0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.222 0.111 0.067 0 
Sub-county 
political 
0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 1 0 
Sub-county 
administrative 
0 0 0 0 0 0.333 0.500 0.222 0 0.111 
Sub-county 
administrative 
0 0 0 0 0 3 3 4 0 1 
District  
administrative 
0 0 0.167 0 0 0.167 0.333 0.567 0.500 0.167 
District  
administrative 
0 0 1 0 0 3 6 17 15 3 
District  
political 
0 0 0 0 0 0.133 0 0.367 0.200 0 District political 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 11 4 0 
NGO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.278 0.133 0 NGO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 2 0 
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In a focus group discussion held with village members regarding the information reporting chain and 
the role of the various actors, it was revealed that there was little contact between citizens (WUCs and 
village residents) and sub-county extension staff. This finding was confirmed during a second village 
focus group at which the results of the study were presented, as villagers stated that no extension staff 
visit had occurred since the start of the research project. Sub-county extension staff point out that they 
have to monitor all water sources in several villages within their sub-county and, as villages are often 
widely scattered and transportation is very costly and time-consuming, they are limited in the frequency 
with which they can monitor those water sources. Some extension staff are also inclined to seek 
additional employment to complement what they feel is an insufficient wage, thereby further limiting 
the time they have available for monitoring water service delivery. Finally, insufficient performance 
evaluation of the work of sub-county staff may also contribute to inadequate monitoring of local water 
service activities (see also Golooba-Mutebi 2012; Mugumya 2013; Quin et al. 2011). 
Bridging the divide 
The different analyses above indicate a bottleneck in information flow, mostly between the village level 
(and possibly parish level) and higher governance levels (sub-county and district). Regarding upward 
information flow, ICT tools could potentially be used to drastically reduce the social network distance 
that information on dysfunctional infrastructure or water quality issues has to travel.  
First, geographical distance is important. A network distance of one step between for example the 
parish-level chief and the sub-county chief may require a journey of over 20 km (a huge barrier in 
settings with limited transportation means), while the same step between the district-level engineer and 
CAO only requires going to the office across the hall. Secondly, not only geographical distance but also 
‘social distance’ – caused by differences in attributes such as gender, education, culture and social status 
– can be difficult to bridge. Using ICT tools (eg a mobile phone community-based monitoring app) 
could potentially overcome both types of distance. Allowing village-level actors (eg the village 
chairperson, the WUC or community monitors) to enter water-related information collected at local 
level into an online monitoring tool accessible by both sub-county and district technical staff would 
significantly reduce the time and financial resources needed to channel data upward. Additionally, these 
ICT-driven tools might also overcome some of the ‘social distance’ hurdles, as little direct personal 
interaction would be needed.  
The visual illustrations and discussions of centrality SNA analysis further suggest that the ideal persons 
to supply the ICT-fed data should be situated at the village level, rather than at the parish or sub-county 
level. A fully operational WUC would be best placed to collect the data, given their roles and experience. 
A WUC member could, for instance, use his/her mobile phone to send information about the accessibility, 
functionality and quality of a point water source, which could be uploaded directly into an online 
database, thereby significantly improving the quality of data available to district policy-makers. In 
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places where the WUC is not (yet) functional, the LC I chairperson may be a key resource to collect 
this type of data, given the centrality of his or her position. This database, containing all the uploaded 
disaggregated data, could then be made readily available to district-level actors, including the DWO. 
In terms of downward information streams, however, ICT may be a less suitable instrument to pass on 
relevant information to all stakeholders, as some information might exceed what can be processed in a 
text message, and not all villagers may be reachable through short message services (SMS) (Dewachter 
et al. 2018).  In an ideal situation, frequent upward and downward communication between sub-county 
technical/administrative (extension) staff, functional WUCs, the village chairperson and village 
residents should complement any ICT tools that are available and should reduce the distance that 
information has to travel to reach its intended audience. 
Conclusion  
This article has examined the information flow networks amongst actors from village up to district level 
in Uganda, in relation to their contribution to effective water service delivery. The assumption was 
made that efficient water services management requires effective upward and downward 
communication streams between technical/administrative and political duty bearers, on the one hand, 
and WUCs and point water source users on the other. Accurate information about access to, 
functionality of and quality of water at point water sources, as well as new demand for point water 
sources among the population, needs to reach the relevant actors at the district level. Likewise, it is 
assumed that it is beneficial if information about water services is communicated down through the 
levels of local governance to WUCs (if functional) and water users. 
The authors constructed a theoretical social network model of the hierarchical reporting framework for 
water in Uganda, on the basis of Uganda’s Local Governments Act 1997 and the National Framework 
for Operation and Maintenance of Rural Water Supplies 2011 and complemented it with a theoretical 
information-sharing network based on the framework established by Quin et al. (2011). The subsequent 
analysis contrasted these two theoretical networks with the actual information-sharing network in a village 
in Bushenyi District in Uganda. The authors compared ‘what’s on paper’ with what takes place in reality, 
so as to identify any missing links and potential bottlenecks in the information flows, and to propose 
effective measures to improve communication networks and ultimately rural water services provision.  
In a first step, the analysis focused on the information-sharing network among local governance actors, 
including political and administrative duty bearers at different governance levels. The results showed 
that, in terms of the intensity of information exchange, reality clearly outperforms the mere ‘reporting’ 
chain network envisaged by legislation, and more closely resembles Quin’s theoretical information-
sharing network. However, results also indicated that the actual information-sharing network is more 
centralised in terms of who receives and sends information than either of the theoretical networks, and 
is also far less reciprocal than the reporting network in regard to the information being shared among 
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the actors. Thus, despite the actual information-sharing network being positively correlated to both 
theoretical networks, there are still significant differences in the structural features of the networks. 
Zooming in to observe who is more central in the network, and differentiating between different actors 
and governance levels, crucial differences became even more apparent. The biggest discrepancy 
between the official and actual monitoring and evaluation networks was found to be in the role of the 
DWO, who turned out to be the most central actor in the information-sharing network with regard both 
to sending and receiving information, and to strategic information control. This finding contrasts with 
the more modest role attributed to this function on paper. Additionally – and less surprisingly – the 
study found that, among government actors, the sub-county chairperson, the CAO and the district 
engineer also play a crucial role within the network.  
Conversely, some actors turned out to be more ‘peripheral’ than expected; for example the sub-county 
technical/administrative staff, and the parish-level duty bearers. In theory, sub-county extension staff 
should liaise with lower-level actors (village and parish) and collect information about water services 
to report to decision-making actors at higher levels. However, these staff are often poorly incentivised 
and constrained by limited resources and transportation problems.  Overall, the inter- and intra-group 
information exchange analyses suggest that the political–administrative information exchange functions 
reasonably well, but the information exchange between different governance levels – notably, that 
between higher (district and sub-county) and the lower (parish and village) governance levels – is 
problematic. Additionally, most information exchange seems to be geared toward horizontal or upward 
information flows, with far fewer downward information flows. Information flows from the sub-county 
level to lower governance levels seem to be very underdeveloped. 
Upon adding villagers, WUCs and NGOs to the actual information-sharing network, the real importance 
of the village chairperson became apparent. Most upward information flow from the village level to 
higher levels goes through the village chairperson, making him or her a crucial broker in the information-
sharing network, as this role represents one of the only gateways through which information about water 
can eventually reach those with the power to make decisions on water services. It also makes the 
network quite vulnerable, given that a great deal of information flow depends on one person.  
Given these findings, the authors make two initial recommendations. Firstly, extension workers, meant 
to reach out to communities and villagers, could increase their efficiency and reduce the vulnerability 
of the information-sharing network by creating some direct interactions with WUCs. Secondly, ICT 
tools would be useful to improve the flow of specific information about point water sources (eg use, 
access, functionality and quality) to the district office, as using ICT would decrease the number of 
‘steps’ for the information to travel. From the study results, it becomes apparent that streamlining 
vertical information flows (top-down and bottom-up) is critical to improving rural water supply. 
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